Friedrich Nietzsche Ecce homo


§ Humour


Humour chracterises much of Nietzsche’s writing, always allowing himself to laugh rather than grow angry at anything. One can see him prancing around, smashing lilies underfoot, uncaring of what sacred cows he throws dirt on. But there is always a reason behind everything he says in this tone, even though it might not be explicitly stated around the infringing statement, and must instead be figured out by the audience from the afterthoughts of the context as a whole.

Humour prevents one from falling into the stagnation that comes about as a result of unyielding emotional obsession with issues under discussion; light feet allow the un-German germanic thinker1 to always move on as if without greater consequence. Some have considered Nietzsche to be a “thoroughly irresponsible thinker”, because the norm of the (superficially) sanitised West is to tip-toe around everything hypocritically while sacrificing those around in order to feel better. Nietzsche says what needs to be said, by transmitting the bare truth as he sees it, divested from personal desires and simply as it presents itself.

Humour also allows for an easy way through honesty, avoiding being chocked with the grave seriousness that his statements are bound to instill in whoever hears or read or heard him. That is not to say that Nietzsche detracts from their importance, but that he can by applying to a humourous mood treat them efficiently, with an agile mind and without reservations.


§ Pride and Earnestness


Nietzsche has always embraced a healthy, flexible pride which has been misrepresented more often than not, and perhaps by those who judge others by their own limitations. This is a pride that is sure of the individual’s worth, not as a mantra, but as a plain recognition of proficient abilities, thus of worth and reach. It is also a pride which may appear to fall into the trap of ego-bloating, but the latter is soon understood as device rather than as the shield and justification of weaker fatalist minds of today.

In contrast with the Socratic method of covert insubordination and dishonest double-facing, Nietzsche chooses the way of open dissent. This dissent is, moreover, wielded as a weapon rather than becoming an all-consuming end in itself —In this lies the greatest difference between prophets with a mission, like Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, and the rebels without a transcendent cause which plague a modernist landscape onto which they project all manner of self-justifications.

Nietzsche never concedes to having to justifying himself; he presents, he elaborates, and the burden of going beyond prejudices is left to the reader, who has to learn of the point of view of the thinker. This has actually proven to be too much for most people, and where he is not outright rejected as heretic against everything, he is wrongfully appropriated into camps where he does not belong.

At the very bottom of it all, under all his witty prose and rhythmic expression, lies the hard content —the actual proposition. Most people, even professionals, seem to get stuck in the outer layers, trapped in whatever their own ego cannot let go, or whatever makes it feel larger —the trap of Nietzschean literature. The essence of Nietzsche’s thought is highly impersonal, though stated unapologetically in a very personal tone and idiosyncratic expression.


Footnotes

1 While Nietzsche’s allusions to a Polish nobility descent can be taken as his exemplification of an illustration of freedom from morality through appropriation, contrary to what he despised in contemporary German culture; however, Nietzsche was thoroughly German. Nietzsche detested German idealism, and probably ran in the contrary direction to find in the lack of accountability of the Polish nobility —and probably self-interested individualism— an extreme symbol for his utter rejection of idealism.

Prognosis de un Elitismo Personal — Parte II: Más Allá del Gusto Personal


§ Más Allá del Gusto Personal


 En su libro más personal, Nietzsche toca el tema del gusto personal, tanto para las artes como para cualquier otra cosa. Dice, en la octava sección del segundo capítulo de Ecce homo, que lo que este “gusto” realmente es, es un instinto de autodefensa. Procede después el ilustre filósofo a detallar como utilizar las energías propias de manera eficiente, a través de un buen gusto, para no diluirse a uno mismo. Aquí interrumpimos la idea de esta autodefensa y llevamos la conversación a otro plano: si además de proteger quienes somos y lo que es cercano a nuestras convicciones, osamos, a través de nuestra exposición selectiva, abrir puertas y ahondar nuestro ser, ¿cómo habría de ser nuestro proceder?

 Si en lugar de una constante indulgencia de caprichos, utilizáramos nuestras capacidades de atención selectiva y discernimiento para encontrar una dirección, el gusto personal dejaría de ser mera autodefensa y se tornaría en herramienta de nuestra evolución consciente, por así llamarle. Dicho discernimiento no abandona ni deja de lado, sin embargo, la intuición; más bien se entabla una conversación entre las distintas facultades de la mente, y se vuelve la intuición en un puente entre lo consciente y lo inconsciente, pero ya no como la brújula que nos guiaba ciegos en pos de emociones dictadas por el inframundo personal.

Las implicaciones son claras: el tiempo que le damos a cada cosa, y la energía que substrae la interacción en esa actividad, se evalúa en base a como se alinea con un enriquecimiento de lo que algunos llamarían nuestra alma; de manera más precisa, representa un paso hacia adelante y en una dirección en particular fuera de la ilusión. Para hacer esto es también necesario saber que es lo que se quiere ser o, inclusive, que es lo que no se quiere ser. La excelencia fuera de la ilusión social, por ejemplo, no tiene cabida para cualquier cosa que represente la mediocridad espiritual de todo lo que yace dentro de ella, ya sean libros de ficción barata, o música de carácter banal (en cuanto a su pura expresión musical, que se expresa sin necesidad de letras o explicaciones).

Es necesaria la honestidad para consigo mismo, de manera que la fuerza del ego se contrarresta y se desafianzan los fetiches, especialmente cuando éstos se resguardan bajo el manto del gusto personal. Asimismo hace falta el querer progresar, lo cual implica no solamente el reconocimiento de la condición precaria, si no también la fuerza, el deseo y la voluntad para moverse. Mediante esta dinámica también ha de perder el individuo el miedo a dejar de ser quien uno cree que es —el dejar ir del ego, llamado así popularmente, y volverse el que busca, y transformarse en todo lo que se puede ser.

En el sentido aquí planteado, ir más allá del gusto personal no quiere decir volverse más abierto o más tolerante en ningún sentido, si no el dejar atrás la auto indulgencia ciega por una indulgencia del camino solitario aparte de los demás y de ninguna manera para o por ellos; el dejar de ser dominado por el inconsciente y las fuerzas de las grandes corrientes psicológicas a las cuales están sujetas las masas, para convertirse en su propio amo, su propia ancla, su propia luz, así como su propia obscuridad —y lo que allá más allá de esas divisiones en el más sencillo pero difícil encuentro con la propia esencia.

Friedrich Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil


§ An inscrutable thinker


To begin with, and despite the title of the section under which this article is posted, this is not a review, and perhaps not even a commentary on this great work, but rather a series of thoughts around impressions of it held by several groups, in contrast to what may be a more accurate consideration of the man in question and his work. It seems that all that is needed to claim Nietzsche’s ideas as support for an ideological stance is to have somewhat of a thick skin or simply be alright with blunt criticism of anything one disagrees with. The interesting thing about Nietzsche is that he is at once glorified and vilified by people with widely differing ideologies across the full spectrum, with the exception of those explicitly following a Judeo-Christian kind defense of the weak, the mediocre and anything “human, all too human”.

Atheists claim him as one of their own, as they superficially read his words and take them to mean that Nietzsche was the highest kind of independent mind there was. In truth, Nietzsche can be seen criticizing both the dogmatic religious and the modern hubris of the modern atheist, even if he does not name each specifically and in quite such words. The attention of his sledge hammer is directed most of all to the flowering atheism and scientism that was taking Europe by storm at the time of his writing Beyond Good and Evil, and which atheism (or at least crypto-atheism disguised as a kind of philosophical pantheism) and scientism has since become the norm among the educated, and especially among the liberal-minded. Nietzsche dispenses as much injury upon the religious as upon the anti-religious. What he argued for was not the absence of a morality or a tradition, but the distinction between qualities of it, and their origin.

There is MASTER-MORALITY and SLAVE-MORALITY,—I would at once add, however, that in all higher and mixed civilizations, there are also attempts at the reconciliation of the two moralities, but one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual misunderstanding of them, indeed sometimes their close juxtaposition—even in the same man, within one soul.

Aristocrats claim him, even though he devotes large portions of his thought to demolishing any claims of nobility that modern aristocrats might still hold on to. The nobility to which Nietzsche so often alludes is one that is proven through spirit and resulting action thereof: that is, the Will; the Will to Life and Power (alluded to here in the sense that Gwendolyn Taunton has exposed in the past1). His is a nobility that self-creates through this Will, and whose decisions are based upon results and high aims with a vision of centuries, and which does not rest upon vainglorious pride, but rather the question of how to improve. This nobility, however, does reserve a right to determine notions of what should be or what should not be, and there lies the difference between literal nobility, of which Nietzsche speaks, and the allegorical nobility which the humanist modern man would like to believe in.

Purists, and National Socialist types would cringe if they would have actually studied Nietzsche. For, while he deals a significant amount of damage to the Jew, enough to actually garner enough merit to be awarded the title of “anti-semite” he also gives them credit where it is deserved in a manner not unlike Hitler in Mein Kampf, actually, though with different aims and perhaps coming to different practical conclusions. The nobility of action, which was that of a created spirit, could perhaps be better aligned with Julius Evola’s nobility of the spirit, which was not independent of blood but rather worked through and above it in a supra-eugenic manner.

It stands to reason that the more powerful and strongly marked types of new Germanism could enter into relation with the Jews with the least hesitation, for instance, the nobleman officer from the Prussian border: it would be interesting in many ways to see whether the genius for money and patience (and especially some intellect and intellectuality — sadly lacking in the place referred to) could not in addition be annexed and trained to the hereditary art of commanding and obeying — for both of which the country in question has now a classic reputation.

Anarchists claim him, even though he clearly believes only an incredibly small percentage of the population can be truly free, as a result of innate abilities that not all possess and the opportunities to develop them. Rather than push towards the idea of a world where every individual is completely independent, a natural hierarchy is deemed by Nietzsche as inevitable, whatever social constructs humans might like to dream on about. The roots for these lie deep in our nature and in Nature, and attempting to change them is usually a path towards self-annihilation, and an overall sentiment that is anathema to Life itself.

“We truthful ones”—the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves. It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were at first applied to MEN; and were only derivatively and at a later period applied to ACTIONS.

It is then also common to hear people who in their youth upheld Nietzsche as a pillar of their own ideology, only to later reject what they thought his philosophy consisted of, on the basis of them changing the emphasis and focus of their own narrow-minded understanding. The former anti-religious communist becomes a progressive advocate of combinatorics chaos theory and real politik in an attempt to out-intellectualize the philosopher, while of course, distancing himself from the word ‘intellectual’, even as he poses as one. The former modern aristocrat finds the truth about the depth of corrupt modernity and so turns against the philosopher as if he were part of this, and as if tradition as the answer were wholly incompatible with the ideas of Nietzsche. Each of them have only moved from one misapprehension into another, without ever actually having captured the essence of Nietzsche’s thought.

What is he really about, then? Nietzsche was, in fact, terribly honest and direct, even though people seem to insist upon reading him in the most cryptic of ways, perhaps in an attempt to validate themselves and avoid what he was actually urging humanity towards. In truth, it is quite difficult to finish creating a personal picture of Nietzsche, because one has to read his particular takes on so many things before one can even begin to glimpse what his stated proposal of the Übermensch actually entails. The statement “beyond good and evil” entails precisely what it seems to state, rather than an allegorical turn of phrase, a state in which the superior individual does not concern itself with dichotomies and labels, and rather finds the reality of self-determined action beyond them. Since the great majority of humanity functions through and lives by these symbols, faiths and abstractions, the immediate reality, and more importantly, the patterns and not the appearances that constitute this reality2, to which Nietzsche constantly refers eludes them every time as they refuse to see what is in front of them in favor of their own construct thereof.


Footnotes

1 “To Nietzsche, the figure of Dionysus is the supreme affirmation of life, the instinct and the Will to Power, with the Will to Power being an expression of the Will to Life and Truth at its highest exaltation.” —Gwendolyn Taunton, ‘The Black Sun’, Primordial Traditions, Vol I.

2 A notion elegantly and concisely explained by Brett Stevens in his book Nihilism, as a condensation of Nietzsche, Spinoza and Plato, perhaps even through the digestion of others.